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3. The classical oligopoll-Bame
In thia section we will discuss a special economic game
with seta of strategies
- (~ > 0. k=1.2 •••••n)~ = Lo. ~J (19 )
and pay-off functiona
n
'fk (xl····.~ ) = ~ f LXi - ~(~). (20)
i=l
whel'e the functions f and ~ muat have the properties:
n
S lf) = [O. LJ. whel' e
classical oli~oll-game.
Before discUBsing the equilibrium problem of this game we
ShbW how the game appears in seme applicationa.
!2Plication l. Assume that n factories manufacture the
same product and they sell i t on the same market. let f be the
unit price of the product being a function of the total production
level. and let Rk be the cost function of the manufacturer k.
Then ~ is the production bound for manufacturer k and
f k (xl''' •• X n ) is i ts netto income assumìng that xi is the
production level of the manufacturer i for i=1.2 •••••n.
AE,Plication 2. Assume that a multipur'pose water supply
system has to be designed. let the water users denoted by k
(k=1.2 •••••n) and let the water quantity given to user k be
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be the investment cost being a function
I~tk=1.2 •••••n.
n
of L ~. 1et
k=l
for
capacity bounde of the usere are denotedby xk • If the
then obvious1yby
denoted
Vk(~) and wk(~) be the production costo income and the economie
loss of the water shortage /penalty e.t.c./ of user' k.
respective1y. ~t us assume. that the total investment cost i~
devided by the users in the rate of the water quantity used by
the water users. Thus the tota1 incorne of user k can be determined
by the function
n~ I L Xi- n
L Xi i=l
i=l
(21)
By introduceing the notations
n n
f L l I LXix. - -~ n
i=l LXi i=1
i=l
function <21~ has immediate1y form (20).
~lication J, ~t us now assume that n factories are
on the bank of a r'iver and they send a certain quanti ty of
waste-water to the river. It is also assumed that the total
penalty paid by the factories i8 a function of the total waste-
-water quanti ty sent to the river and i t is devided among the
factories proportional1y to the waste-water quanti tysent to the
river' by the different factories. I.et ~ be the total waste-
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-water quantity produced by factory k, let xk be the waste-water
quantity sent to the river' by factory k. Then the total "income"
of factory k can be given by the formula
( 22)
where Pis the penalty function, ek is the cleaning cost of
factory k. let
n
p L Xi '
i=l
l
= - n
L Xi
i=l
then the function (22) immidiately has the form of (20).
Firat we shaw that the equilibrium problem of the classical
oligopoly game ia equivalent to a fixed point problem of a one
dimension point-to-set mapping. It will be much more convenient
than the application of the fixed point problem of lemma 1, since
the latter ia an n-dimensionaI problem.
let
'+'k(s, ~, t k ) = t k r(s - ~ + t k ) - Y"k(tk )
•
for k=l,2, •• ,n J 8 ~ [O, q, ~ ~ CO, ~] and t k ~ [o, ~] ,
where t'k = min {~, .b - 8 + X k\. Since f k :; 0, tne interval
for t k can not be empty. Far k=l,2, •• ,n; 8 ~ [o, 1J; Xk ~ [O, ~1
let
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and for k=1.2 •• •• n ; s ~ [O. 1] let
Lemma h A vector !,H = e H ii).Xl' •••• Xh ~s an equilibrium point
of the classical oligopoly game if and
n
(k=1.2 ••••• n). where SH = 2: x: .
k=l
onlv if
-
Proof. The definition of the equilibrium point implies
that a strategy vector !l:.Jf. = (x~.....~) is an equilibriulI' point
if and only if
for k=1.2 •••• ,n and t k E [o, ~J. /It is easy to observe thatn
for sI( ~~ i'k = ~/ Inequali ty (23) is equivalent= ,
i=l
to the fact that x!l e: Tk (sJl. ~) , that is xH i ~ (sft). •k k
Let us finally introduce the following one dimensional
point-to-set mapping:
n
Xls) = {u lu = LXi' Xi ~Xils)} (s € [O, 1J). (24)
i=l
Lemma 1. and definition (24) imply the following important result.
Theorem 3. A vector equilibrium
point of the
n
li L òlI:s - ~-
i=l
classical oliaopoly game if and only if for
,
• •
pOJ..n"G
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Remark. The solution of the ~ame has two steps:
:3tep l: the solution of the one dimensionaI i'ixeci
problem sft E X(SH);
Step 2: the cietermination o~' sets Xl( (SH) and the computation
of the vectors xH - (x~, .•• ,x~ ) such that
-
-
il
H
, :s: (s*) (k= l, 2, ••• ,n) and il: L x HX. S - •K 1{
k=l
In the followin6 parts oi tllis section we will assume that
the conditions given below are satisfied.
l. There exists a constant ~ >° such that
al f (s) -
°
for 8 ::. ~ .
- - ,
-
bi f l8 continuous, concave and strictly decreasing
ln the interval [o, n·
2. For k=l, 2, ••• , n function Y1: is continuous, convex
and strictly increasing in the interval [O, ~J.
_o
'Iheorem ~ Under the above conditions the game has at
least one equilibrium point.
Proof. The proof consists of several steps.
-
al First we prove
equilibrium point, then
that if x*
n
Lxt:~t
k=l
•lS an
• Let us suppose that
and L ~ + X k >( • This implies
i'k
n
L H >çxk •
Ic=l
°< X\c <
H
Xk
-
Then there are positive x*k and such that
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(X~, ••. ,~, ..• ,X~ )=
( ili li ii)xl' •• , t Xk , ••• ,~ , which is a contraàiction to inequality
bi I.et
x = {~ I~ = (xl'··· ,Xn ),
n
L X k .:::-
-
" l.. lo.=
le=1,2, ••• ,n } •
Next we prDve that any equilibrium point ~1i of the generalizeu
game r = (n; Xl' ••• '):n' X; fl' ... ,f n ) gives an equilibrium
point for the classical oligopoly game. Let xk ~ [O, ~].
If ( ii j( ii li)r!'xl' •• "xk _ l , x k ' xlc+l'.'.'~ 'II!: ,C, then the equilibrium
property for same r •<:;~ves
'f k (~, ••• ,X~ , ••• ,~ ) ~ \f' k (x~, ..• ,xk ' ....X~ ) ,
and if (x~, ••• ,xk "'. ,X~ ) f.:::, then
= O.f L X~ - 11((0) = f k (x~, ... ,O' •• "~)~ fk(x~, ... ,x~"",~}
ilk
s inc e (x~, ••• , 0, ••• ,~ ) ~ x.
cl Next we prove tl~t if function h is continuous, concave
and strictly decreasing in a nonnegative interval CA, B], tnen
the function xh(x) is concave in the same interval.
Let U8 first assume that h is twice continuously
differentiab le.
Then
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{Xh(Xl}' " xh'(x) T n(x),
{xhlx)) " " 2h'(x) + xh"( X) < \.,
which implies the assertion.
If h :lS continuous, tl,en let \n ([;j"1,2, •• ) ue twice
continuously àifferenciable, concave, strictly decreasing
functiom such that lirJ , ,DU; " Il.
Let A ~ x <: y !f. Lj 0(, (>J ~ G; -x _,o f" " l, then l'or :J],,1,2 •••
Jy the limi t relation m _00> we obtain
(<XX + i?y)b ( <Xx T ,r>, y):- o',xb(xì + hyh(y),
thus xh(x) is concave.
di The parts al ana bi imply that the classica~ oligopoly
game and the generaIized game r = (n; ;;l""'Xn ' X; -f I ,··., f r,)
have the same equilibrium points. Under the assumptions of tne
theorem X is a convex, closed,
continuous and part cl implies
bounded subset of Rn , 'f k
that \fk is concave in
,
:lS
Thus the conditions of the Nikaido-Isoda theorem are satisfied,
consequently the game has at Ieast one equilibrium point. ..
no\;
Remark. 'Ine uniqueness of the equilibrium point iSfassureG
in general as the followin[ example sbows.
Example ~ Let n=2; ~"12 = 1,2 ;
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1,75 - 0,5s, if O~ s ~ 1,5
f (s) - 2,5 - s, ii' 1,5f;s&2,5
°
, i.f s > 2,5
(x;;- O).
•,
de will prove that ano arbi trary point of the set
g~ves an equilibrium point of the game.
Lét ? E [0,5 ; lJ oe fixed, ana let
\f!(x) :: xf(1,5 - x + x*) - I\(x)
It is easy to verify that
( k::l, 2. ).
and
'+" (x* - O):: x~(-0.5) - l - 0,5:: 0,5(1 - x~)= O,
*' (xil "' O) :: Xii ( -l) + l - 0,5 - O C"- , .J ~- x .c O.
-
Part cl implies that function Y is concave ln v"" ,
consequently from the inequalities q-" (x~ - O) ~ O and
11'" (x~ + O) we conclude that !li maximumpoint ofcan x ~s a
the function 4J • Thus arbitrary x!li € XIi lS an equilibrium point.
Next we discuss a numerical algorithm for findig the
equilibrium points of the classical oligopoly game. Under the
assumptinns of Theorem 4. the following statements are true.
Lemma 8.
al For s e- [O, L] , ::\c(sì is not empty and is a closei
interval ["\(s), 1\(s)J ' (k:::i.,2, ••• ,n) ;
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b/ for ° ~ s < s'!:. L the inequality I\;(s') ;: ~(s)
holds for k=1,2, ••• ,n ;
c/ if f is differentiable at the point s, then
~ls) = 1\ (S) •,
d/ if f is differentiable in the inte:rval [o, I,J , then
-
~(s) is a continuous function of s.
Proof. Parts a/ and b/ can be proven by simple modifica-
tions of parts e/al and G/bl of the proof of Theorem l. in
•
paper (lOJ. The statements cl and d/ are proven :in the C/a,b,c
part of the proof of Theorem l. in paper [lOJ.
Lemma 9. If !i:,H = (x~, •• " ~) and !J8f. = (x~,. •• ,~- )
are equilibrium pointsof the classical oligopoly game having
the properties given in Theorem 4., then
•
n n
L~=L~H3t·
k=l k=l n n
S H _ \ 1 x..'" < siiii = '" x..1fili •Preoi. Assume that L- K L K
k=l k=l
Then
n
sH = L x: :;
k=l
n n
~ L I\; (sJi!!) ~ L x~ =
k=l k=l
which is a contradiction. •
Corollary. The point-to-set mapping X(s) has exactly one
fixed point, which can be computed by the usual bisection method
(see F; Szidarovszky, S.Yakowitz [12J).
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Theorem 2' Asaume that the conditions of Theoreo 4. are
satisfied. Let s* be the 1J~jque fixed point of the mappinc
X(s). Then alI equilibrium points of the c1assica1 oligopo1:>'
bame can be obtained by the solution of the system of 1inear
equations and inequa1ities:
,\(sft) ~ ~ : l\:(s*)
n
'\' x = SliL_ k
k=l
(k=l,2, • •• ,n)
preof. The statefuent is a consequence of Lemma u. arill
lemma 9. •
Corollary. If in addition to the conditions of Theorem 4.
function f is differentiab1e on the interval [o, LJ, then tllli
equilibrium point is unique.
Remark l. It is interesting to observe that the game lS
not linear but the set of equi1ibJ:"ium points is a simplex.
Remark 2. The uniqueness of the equi1ibrium point depends
on the differentiabi1ity of a function and not on strict
concavity as i t is usual in the theory of nonlinear programming •
.§'pecial cases.
l. In case of t and ~ (l ~ k ~ n) being twice differentiab1e
the uniqueness was proved by O. Opi tz [7] without giving any
algoJ:"i thm for finding i t.
2. Under the assumptions of O. Opi tz, F. Szidarovszky [JJ
proved the existence and uniqueness of the equi1ibrium point
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and also gave an iterative algoritbm for computing it.
3. If the cost functions l~ are idenoical anù the
d t O Op . t h E B Lrl] provedcon i iona of • ~'Z are satisfied, t en • urger
the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium point and also
gave an algoritbm to compute it. ',7e remark that the algorithm
of Szidarovszky is a generalization of Burger's method.
4. If the functions f and Kk (k=1,2, ••• ,n) are linear,
then the existence and uniqueness was proved by li. Matias,[4] •
who gave an algoritbm which is independent of th~ method of
Szidarovszky. ~e remark that using the result of Theorem 5.
the equilibrium point in this special case can be given in
closed form (see pp. 37-39 of [lOJ).
iJ The group eguilibrium problem
In this paragraph we will discuss the general~zed version
of the classical oligopoly game r having the srategy sets
and pay-off functions
••• (l f k ~ n) (25)
•~k
~ x"L K~
i=l
,
n ~-t
f L LX{j
.(. =1 j=l
(26)
where for k=1,2, ••• ,n'!k = (Xkl"",xkik) E~ • This game
can oeeur when the players of the classical oligopoly game
fom disjoint groups and they tend to the optimal income of
the group. If the number of members in group k is equal to
